The Myth of the Lost Cause Vs. The Real Lincoln

 

This post deals with two books on the “Lost Cause.”

Thomas J. DiLorenzo presents the case for the Lost Cause in The Real Lincoln: A New Look at Abraham Lincoln, His Agenda, and an UnnecessaryWar, while Edward H. Bonekemper argues against the Lost Cause in The Myth ofthe Lost Cause: Why the South Fought the Civil War and Why the North Won.

What is the Lost Cause? The basic tenants are as follows: the War of Northern Aggression had nothing to do with slavery; the South did nothing to provoke war; the Constitution included a right to secede and the South should have been allowed to leave peacefully; antebellum life in the South was prosperous, dignified, and just; slavery was already dying; Robert E. Lee deserved deification, U. S. Grant deserved demonization, the North deserves condemnation for engaging in total war; the South had no chance of winning, and most important of all, Lincoln was a despot who started the war by invading South.

Basically, the Lost Cause is innocence unjustly victimized.

I chose these two specific books because they are both relatively recent (2003 and 2015) and each author presents their respective positions clearly, with entertaining gusto. On which side of this controversy did I land? You can probably guess, but this argument has raged for over one hundred and fifty years and these books will provide all the information you need to make up your own mind.

(These are research books for Maelstrom, a sequel to Tempestat Dawn.)

Grant Takes Command by Bruce Catton

 

When asked, what sort of man is Grant, Lincoln replied that Ulysses S. Grant was “the quietest little fellow you ever saw. The only evidence you have that he’s in any place is that he makes things git! Wherever he is, things move.

Lincoln explained that every other general briefing him before a battle told him that he was short some crucial resource to ensure victory, but, if ordered, they would proceed anyway. This essential resource was almost always cavalry. Lincoln claimed their real purpose was to shift responsibility to him. When Grant took charge, he immediately recommended reassigning twenty thousand horseless cavalrymen to the infantry. Since there was no way to acquire horses for every man designated as cavalry, these idle soldiers were only held in reserve as a handy excuse. Grant recognized the duplicity and removed the excuse before his first battle.

In this biography, Bruce Catton does an excellent job describing the man and his military philosophy. Grant reminded me of General Patton, a warrior through and through. Both believed that to decrease casualties in war, you don’t minimize the fallen in a specific battle, you win the war to stop the killing.

Catton relates a story about a grizzled sergeant leaning against a fence post when a comrade came up.  The sergeant jerked a thumb at a man in the distance and remarked: “That’s Grant. I hate to see that old cuss around. When that old cuss is around there’s sure to be a big fight on hand.”